A note on reliability estimation of functionally diverse systems by Littlewood, B. et al.
Littlewood, B., Popov, P. T. & Strigini, L. (1999). A note on reliability estimation of functionally diverse 
systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 66(1), 93 - 95. doi: 10.1016/S0951-
8320(99)00014-9 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0951-8320(99)00014-9>
City Research Online
Original citation: Littlewood, B., Popov, P. T. & Strigini, L. (1999). A note on reliability estimation of 
functionally diverse systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 66(1), 93 - 95. doi: 
10.1016/S0951-8320(99)00014-9 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0951-8320(99)00014-9>
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1627/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
A note on reliability estimation of
functionally diverse systems
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Abstract
It has been argued that functional diversity might be a plausible means of
claiming independence of failures between two versions of a system. We
present a model of functional diversity, in the spirit of earlier models of
diversity such as those of Eckhardt and Lee, and Hughes. In terms of the
model, we show that claims for independence between functionally diverse
systems seem rather unrealistic. Instead, it seems likely that functionally
diverse systems will exhibit positively correlated failures, and thus will be
less reliable than an assumption of independence would suggest. The result
does not, of course, suggest that functional diversity is not worthwhile;
instead, it places upon the evaluator of such a system the onus to estimate
the degree of dependence so as to evaluate the reliability of the system.
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Background
There is now a considerable literature on probabilistic conceptual models for
design diversity and its impact upon the dependence of system failures [Eckhardt & Lee
1985, Hughes 1987, Littlewood & Miller 1989, Littlewood 1996].
Whilst the earliest of these, by Eckhardt and Lee, dealt with diversity in multi-
version software, an essentially identical model for hardware systems was developed
independently by Hughes. The key idea in both cases is that the demands placed upon
systems by their environment (i.e. a wider system) can vary in ‘difficulty’, and that this
variation induces dependence upon the failure processes of different ‘diverse’ versions.
Very informally, we say that observing version A to fail causes us to believe that the
demand was probably a ‘difficult’ one, and thus increases the chance that B will fail. It
is shown that the greater the variation in ‘difficulty’ - which is given a formal definition
within the model - the greater the dependence in their failure behaviour. Indeed, they
will fail independently onlyin the case where there is no variation of difficulty at all: a
situation which might reasonably be claimed never to occur in practice.
In this model, using the software terminology, we can think of the versions as
having been developed ‘independently’ in the sense that there was no communication
between the development teams, nor any overriding design authority (apart, of course,
from a common specification). Thus all the differences between the developed versions
will have arisen ‘willy-nilly’. The later models extended this basic idea to incorporate a
notion of ‘forced diversity’, where a higher authority imposes upon the teams specific
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differences in the way that they work: for example, the use of different programming
languages, different testing regimes, etc. The intuitive reasoning here is that forced
differences in the design process might induce the faults in the versions to be different
in kind. In the ideal case, the kinds of faults that would enter version A would not be
present in version B, and vice-versa. In the terminology of ‘difficulty’, those inputs
that were difficult for A would tend not to be difficult for B, and vice-versa.
Functional diversity carries the idea of forced diversity a stage further. Whilst
forced diversity makes the designs of the versions different, each version still receives
the same inputs. In functional diversity, on the other hand, there is a deliberate decision
to make the inputs different. Thus, for example, a protection system might comprise
two versions, one of which makes its trip decision based on temperature inputs, and the
other on pressure inputs.1
The practical intuition here is straightforward and appealing. Forcing the design
teams to use functionally diverse inputs is an attractive way of forcing them to be
‘intellectually diverse’ in their solutions to the design problem. If the designs are ‘very
different’ in some meaningful way, there is a good chance that they will differ usefully
in the faults they contain, and thus tend not to fail together.
Our intention in this note is not to criticise the overall approach of functional
diversity: it looks a sensible approach to achieve reliability in a diverse system. Rather,
we wish to examine how much benefit it is reasonable to claim because of the use of
functional diversity; in particular, whether it is reasonable to claim that the versions will
fail independently.
The model
For ease of exposition we shall continue to use the simple example of a
protection system using temperature inputs, t, a d another using pressure, p. W  shall
also continue to use the language of software, but the arguments deployed here apply
equally well to more general systems.
The figure below shows a grossly simplified version in which there is only one
temperature dimension, and one pressure dimension. A particular demand is then a
point (p,t). This generalises without difficulty to the more realistic case where each of p
and t are vectors.
In the spirit of the earlier models, based upon that of Eckhardt and Lee, we have
a set, P, of programs that could be built to take p inputs, and a set of programs, T that
could be built to take t inputs. A particular development of a ‘pressure’ program can be
thought of as the random selection of a program, , from P; a development of a
‘temperature’ program is the random selection of a program, t , from T. These
selections are determined by probability measures on the sets P a d T.
In operation, demands are selected randomly from the space of all demands
with probabilities that are determined by the operational profile: the probability of
selecting  (p,t) we shall denote by f (p,t). For such a demand, a ‘temperature’ program
will use t as input, a ‘pressure’ program will use p.
                                                
1 We use this simple example only for clarity of exposition, and do not mean to suggest that real
systems would have such simple diversity.
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We can now define ‘difficulty’ functions for the p inputs, and for the  inputs:
(p) = P(randomly selected  fails on p)
and similarly for (t).
t
p
(p,t)(p,t)
allowable demand
region
Consider now a 1-out-of-2 system built from a randomly chosen ‘pressure’
program and an independently randomly chosen ‘temperature’ program. We shall
define the demand ifficulty to be:
, (p,t) = P(randomly selected ( , ) fail together on (p,t)) (1)
An interpretation of ‘functional diversity’ within this model is that there is
independence here, i.e. that for every (p,t) the two programs fail independently:
, (p,t) = (p) (t) (2)
This conditional failure independence is similar to the conditional independence
in the Eckhardt and Lee model, and in the forced diversity model of Littlewood and
Miller [Eckhardt & Lee 1985, Littlewood & Miller 1989].
Unfortunately, this independence does not imply that there is unconditional
independence between version failures. This can be seen as follows.
P(randomly selected ( , ) fail together on randomly selected (p,t)) = E p,t[ , (p,t)]
= E p,t[ (p) (t)] = (p) (t)
p,t
å fp,t(p,t) (4)
and in general this is not equal to E p[ (p)]Et[ (t)], the product of the individual
version probabilities of failure.
There will be equality here if
f p,t(p,t) = fp(p) ft(t) (5)
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i.e. if in the selection of a demand (p,t) the values of ‘pressure’ and ‘temperature’ are
independent of one another. However, this seems unlikely ever to be so.
In fact, the reliability of the 1-out-of-2 system will be less than what could be
inferred by an assumption of independence of failures between the two versions, so
long as
E p,t[ (p) (t)] > E p[ (p)]Et[ (t)]
i.e.
Covp,t[ (p), (t)] > 0. (6)
In other words, so long as the difficulty functions are positively correlated, the
system will be less reliable than if the versions exhibited failure independence.
Conversely, if it can be argued that this correlation is n g tive, the system will be more
reliable than under version failure independence. Claims for such negative correlation
might be hard to justify, however.
Discussion
One interpretation of the result here is that functional diversity is just a kind of
forced diversity, similar to that already seen for diverse software versions that execute
the same inputs as one another: the result here is very similar to that reported in
[Littlewood & Miller 1989]. Once again, the result stems from variation of ‘difficulty’
within the subspaces P and T, and in particular how these difficulty functions are
correlated over the allowable set of demands in P Ä T .
It seems reasonable to represent the informal claim that ‘functional diversity
gives independent failures’ by conditional independence, (2). This seems to capture the
intuitive notion that for each demand, (p,t), the versions are doing such different things
that the failure of one does not tell us anything about the chance of failure of the other.2
Unfortunately, this conditional independence does not imply unconditional
independence: it is unconditional independence that is needed to be able to claim that the
probability of failure of the system is just the product of the version probabilities of
failure for a future randomly selected demand.
Clearly, the process of selecting demands will never result in statistical
independence of the version inputs, p and t, (5). Whilst this observation does not rule
out the possibility of zero correlation between the version difficulty functions - (5) is
sufficient for this but is not necessary - there will clearly be a strong possibility of
positive correlation, (6).
It would seem unreasonable simply to asser hat there is failure independence
between versions: the result above shows that this would be a strong assertion about
the nature of the different difficulty functions. Similarly, it would be even harder to
justify a claim that functional diversity induced negative correlation.
Of course, this reasoning does not suggest that the use of functional diversity is
not good practice: on the contrary, it seems likely that it is indeed a good means of
achieving high reliability. What is not possible, however, is to claim that the use of
                                                
2 Notice that if the claim for conditional independence here cannot be supported, then reasoning about
the degree of dependence will be difficult and most probably will need to take account of our
understanding of the process by which faults are generated.
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functional diversity is sufficient in itself to justify an assumption of independence in the
version failures. It leaves the system assessor with the task of evaluating precisely how
dependent the versions are before he/she can evaluate the reliability of the system. This
is not easy.
In fact this task seems as difficult as evaluating the reliability of the fault-tolerant
system from scratch as if it were a black box, since it requires sufficient empirical
evidence of coincident failures to enable statistical estimation of the probability of
coincident failure. This contrasts with the much easier task we would face if we could
assume independence, since in that case only the (comparatively) modest individual
version reliabilities need to be estimated.
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